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Duterte’s Resurgent Nationalism in the 
Philippines: A Discursive Institutionalist 
Analysis 
Julio C. Teehankee 
Abstract: Early in his administration, Rodrigo Duterte, the controversial 
sixteenth president of the Philippines, did what no other Filipino president 
has done before – announce a separation from the geopolitical interests of 
its former colonial master, the United States of America. Beyond the per-
sonal slights caused by the US criticism of his anti-drug campaign lies a 
deeper sense of historical grievance that has been ingrained in Duterte’s 
generation and his identity as a Mindanaoan. Not only does he represent 
Mindanao’s resentment towards “imperial Manila,” but also a historical 
blowback against “US imperialism.” Duterte’s nationalist exhortations can 
be traced to the cycle of regime narratives in the Philippines, which serves as 
a medium for institutional continuity and change through the mobilisation 
of ideas at a discursive level. By reviving the anti-US nationalism of his 
youth, Duterte is repudiating the liberal reformist, albeit elitist, narrative of 
the Aquino-to-Aquino regimes. Duterte’s so-called “pivot to China” is also a 
dramatic reversal of his predecessors’ strong anti-China and rabidly pro-
American foreign policy position. This paper blends Vivien A. Schmidt’s 
discursive institutional analytical framework with Stephen Skowronek’s 
concept of presidential leadership in political time to analyse how crafted 
narratives are transformed into governance scripts that bind together a coali-
tion of interests within a particular institutional setting. 
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Introduction 
On 20 October 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo R. Duterte boldly 
declared at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, “Your honours, in 
this venue, I announce my separation from the United States.” For most 
observers, the statement was the latest in the growing list of unfiltered 
exhortations from the controversial former mayor of Davao City in the 
southern island of Mindanao. The statement also served as a crescendo 
in the series of verbal insults and expletives he has directed towards the 
United States of America, the European Union and the United Nations. 
Duterte has deeply resented the criticisms raised by the West against his 
ongoing “War on Drugs” which has allegedly claimed the lives of more 
than 3,000 people suspected of being involved in the illegal drug trade.1 
“Unfortunately, this started with the war against drugs,” Duterte 
explained to the press. He added: 
What prompted me to change foreign policy is that almost getting 
a raw deal with the West and the EU signed a manifesto and they 
told me it was prepared by the lawyers and I share that the lawyers 
warned me that I can be prosecuted. (Javier 2016)  
Beyond the personal slights caused by the West’s criticism of his anti-
drug campaign lies a deeper sense of historical grievance that have been 
ingrained in Duterte’s generation and his identity as a Mindanaoan. Not 
only does he represent Mindanao’s resentment towards “imperial Manila,” 
but also a historical blowback against “US imperialism” (Moss 2016; 
Kinzer 2016). The rise of Duterte cannot be separated from the recent 
trend in the Asian region – the mobilisation of nationalism by strong 
leaders to bolster regime legitimacy. Nationalist sentiments and resent-
ment have re-emerged in recent years and have impacted both domestic 
and foreign policy. 
In effect, Duterte is mobilising nationalist rhetoric as a discursive 
repudiation of the reformist narrative of the post-Marcos liberal demo-
cratic regime. This is couched along the constitutional provision of an 
“independent foreign policy” that former National Security Adviser 
General Jose T. Almonte (2016) defined as “not for or against anybody 
                                                 
1  The number of deaths has been separated into those involving legitimate police 
operations and actual cases of state-sanctioned extra-judicial killings. Most of 
the dead victims were left with blood splattered cardboards bearing the words 
“drug pusher”, “drug user”, or “drug lord”. Aside from the killings carried out 
by suspected vigilantes, it is also believed that the killings were part of an inter-
nal purge executed by the drug lords and their corrupt accomplishes in the po-
lice force (see Elemia 2016).  
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but equidistant to everyone.” Duterte’s so-called “pivot to China” is a 
dramatic reversal of his predecessors’ strong anti-China and rabidly pro-
American foreign policy position.2 More than ideological revivalism, Du-
terte’s resurgent nationalism is also driven by pragmatism, as reflected by 
his “position on the South China Sea, calling for a dialogue-based, bilat-
eral settlement of maritime disputes” (Heydarian 2016).  
This paper situates Duterte’s nationalist exhortations within the cy-
cle of regime narratives of the Philippine presidency and the resurgence 
of nationalism in Asia. It adopts a discursive institutional approach in 
demonstrating the power of regime narratives in binding together a coa-
lition of interests within a particular institutional setting. Duterte’s resur-
gent nationalism will be traced to the four enduring regime narratives of 
the Philippine presidency, namely: the narrative of the “unfinished revo-
lution”, the narrative of the “great nation”, the narrative of “good gov-
ernance”, and the narrative of the “masa”. I will then discuss the intellec-
tual roots of Filipino nationalism and its early influence on Duterte’s 
political worldview.  
Rise of Duterte 
The election of Rodrigo Duterte came on the heels of six years of high 
growth and political stability under the administration of President Be-
nigno “Noynoy” Aquino III. However, Duterte’s phenomenal victory 
should be understood within the context of what the second Aquino 
administration has failed to do. Despite his personal popularity, which 
was due to his clean image and lack of personal political scandals, Aqui-
no failed to institutionalise his straight path reformism known as “Daang 
Matuwid” (Teehankee and Thompson 2016b).  
Given his initial popularity and huge social capital and majority that 
the Liberal Party coalition held in both chambers, he could have done 
much more. He could have realised the institutionalisation of his admin-
istration’s mantra of “kung walang corrupt walang mahirap” by pushing for 
socio-political reforms that would have cemented the legacy of his good 
                                                 
2  The Aquino administration was notable for rallying the Philippines against 
China’s controversial historical claims over disputed islands located in the 
South China Sea (or West Philippines Sea as the Philippine Government would 
call it), which are believed to have abundant deposits of oil and gas. Aquino re-
peatedly rejected China’s preference for a bilateral dialogue. Instead, his admin-
istration opted to file an arbitration case on 23 January 2013 against China at 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in Hague to settle the maritime dis-
pute. 
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governance narrative. Had he succeeded in passing the Freedom of In-
formation Bill, the Political Party Development Act and the Anti-
Political Dynasty Act, Aquino would have radically transformed the 
power structure of the country (Teehankee 2014). 
As the first mayor from a major city outside Manila to win the pres-
idency, Duterte’s calls for a federal system drew on ‘anti-Imperial Manila’ 
sentiments, particularly in his birthplace of southern Mindanao. Besides 
this strong regional base (which extended into parts of the Visayas is-
lands), Duterte strongly appealed to voters within Manila itself, where his 
calls for a brutal and immediate implementation of “law and order” have 
resonated particularly well. The exit poll conducted by the Social Weath-
er Stations (SWS) on Election Day showed that most rich and educated 
people voted for Duterte; he received 45.9 per cent of the votes from 
class ABC and 49.2 per cent from those voters who had received some 
graduate level education (Interaksyon.com 2016). Based on the income 
segmentation of the population used by marketers and survey firms, class 
ABC refer to the rich and the middle class. 
Duterte’s victory in the polls is related to frustration and anger with 
the limits of the reformist agenda of the Aquino administration, but 
more generally with the good governance reformist regimes stretching 
back to Fidel Ramos and Corazon Aquino. However, this dissatisfaction 
is different than the kind Joseph Estrada tapped into in 1998 (after the 
“successful” Ramos presidency). It is related less to the dispossessed and 
the losers of “exclusive” growth, and more about the anxieties about 
criminality, rampant smuggling, incompetence, and government corrup-
tion of those now marginally better off after a couple of decades of solid 
growth. It is about the frustrations of the gainers, as well as the anger of 
the losers in Aquino’s so-called growth economy (Teehankee and 
Thompson 2016a). The SWS tracked five continuous quarters of positive 
net gainers in terms of personal change of quality of life between March 
2015 and April 2016. But this was preceded by a long stretch of 18 quar-
ters of negative net gainers from September 2010 to December 2014 
(Teehankee 2016a). 
The Duterte phenomenon is not a revolt of the poor; it is elite-
driven. It is the angry protest of the wealthy, newly rich, well off, and the 
modestly successful new middle class (including call centre workers, 
Uber drivers, and overseas Filipino workers abroad) (Teehankee and 
Thompson 2016b). However, instead of feeling better off, despite robust 
economic growth during the past six years of the Aquino presidency, the 
middle class have suffered from a lack of public services, endured hor-
rendous land and air traffic, feared the breakdown of peace and order, 
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and silently witnessed their tax money being siphoned by corruption 
despite promises of improved governance. They were supposed to be 
the beneficiaries of Daang Matuwid. The poor have their conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) and the rich have their private–public partnerships 
(PPPs). The middle class have been short-changed (Teehankee 2016a). 
From the beginning, Duterte has brought the vulgarity commonly 
found in local political campaigns to the national stage. The curses, 
coarse language and outrageous statements shocked those accustomed to 
more genteel national politics but roused his core supporters, especially 
on social media. Upon his victory, Duterte has demonstrated his aver-
sion with formalities, traditions and the trappings of power by skipping 
his official proclamation by Congress. While most victorious presidential 
candidates would reach out to the various sectors of society to unite the 
country, Duterte has demonstrated contempt for established institutions 
by throwing insults and inflammatory statements against the Roman 
Catholic Church, the media, and even the United Nations (Teehankee 
and Thompson 2016c). 
So far, Duterte has given a preview of the type of presidential lead-
ership he will exercise in power. This is something that the country has 
never experienced before – a maverick presidency; one that is insensitive 
to public opinion; a leader who is unfiltered, unorthodox and speaks his 
mind. His policy decisions will be driven primarily by his own personal, 
idiosyncratic policy views and principles that are often heavily influenced 
by simple stories. In Duterte’s mind-set; he was elected on the platform 
of real (even drastic) change. He believes there is no room for niceties if 
you want realise real change. 
Duterte’s election on 9 May 2016 signified a major rupture in the 
liberal democratic regime re-established 30 years earlier with the ouster 
of the dictatorship of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In the Philippines, a presi-
dency can be a prequel or a sequel to an ongoing regime narrative. A 
president ascends to power either affiliated or opposed to an existing 
regime. An incumbent president’s regime orientation largely determines 
the nature of a presidential administration. The recurrence of these re-
gime orientations provides a structured context for presidential leader-
ship in the pattern of political time.  
Historically, the Philippine presidency can be divided into four dis-
tinct regimes: proto-regimes, the neocolonial regime, the authoritarian 
regime, and the reformist regime (see Table 1). It has spanned five re-
publics that have produced three short-lived (revolutionary, late-colonial 
and occupation) regimes and three long-term (neocolonial, authoritarian 
and reformist) regimes (Teehankee 2016b). The following section will 
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situate the rise of Duterte within the cycle of regime narratives in the 
Philippines. 
Table 1. Philippine Presidential Regimes 
Regime Republic President Date 
Nationalist 
regimes 
First Philippine 
Republic 
Emilio Aguinaldo 23 January 1899– 
1 April 1901 
 Philippine 
Commonwealth
Manuel L. Que-
zon 
15 November 1935–
1 August 1944 
  Sergio Osmeña 1 August 1944– 
28 May 1946 
 Second Philip-
pine Republic 
Jose P. Laurel 14 October 1943– 
19 August 1945 
Neocolonial 
regime 
Third Philip-
pine Republic 
Manuel Roxas 28 May 1946– 
15 April 1948 
  Elpido Quirino 17 April 1948– 
30 December 1953 
  Ramon Magsaysay 30 December 1953–
17 March 1957 
  Carlos P. Garcia 18 March 1957– 
30 December 1961 
  Diosdado 
Macapagal 
30 December 1961–
30 December 1965 
  Ferdinand Marcos 30 December 1965–
21 September 1972 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Fourth Philip-
pine Republic 
Ferdinand Marcos 21 September 1972–
25 February 1986 
Reformist 
regime 
Fifth Philippine 
Republic 
Corazon C. Aqui-
no 
25 February 1986– 
30 June 1992 
  Fidel V. Ramos 30 June 1992– 
30 June 1998 
  Joseph Estrada 30 June 1998– 
21 January 2001 
  Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo 
21 January 2001– 
30 June 2010 
  Benigno Aquino 
III 
30 June 2010– 
30 June 2016 
  Rodrigo Duterte 30 June 2016 
Source:  Teehankee 2016b.  
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Presidential Narratives and Discursive Institu-
tionalism 
Narratives are commonly used in discourse and literary analyses and 
have become a popular interpretive approach in the social sciences. Nar-
ratives are akin to stories and can be defined as “discourses with a clear 
sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite 
audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experi-
ences of it” (Hinchman and Hinchman, as quoted in Elliot 2005: 3). 
Under this definition, narratives are temporal or based on a chronologi-
cal sequence of events; meaningful since they evoke empathy; and social 
as they are communicated to a specific audience (Elliot 2005: 4). 
Like stories, narratives help individuals comprehend a complex 
world. They serve as tools that help bring order into chaos, infuse facts 
with meanings and evoke memories of learning and experiences. Narra-
tives function properly as a fundamental framing device in understanding 
the world. They also provide ready-made points of references from rich 
sources such as literature, myth, and history. By framing one’s campaign 
narrative within these points, a president can project a larger-than-life 
stature in the public’s eye (Cornog 2004). 
Presidential success depends largely on the president’s ability to 
form a consensus around a narrative and generate public support for the 
story line. By capturing the public imagination, the presidential narrative 
crystallises the support needed to build a governing coalition. Crafted 
narratives are the principal medium of exchange that connects a politi-
cian with the issues of the day and with the hearts and minds of the 
voters. An emotive story line connects people with people, humanises 
the politician, and generates public sympathy similar to a lead character 
in the movies or soap opera. Thus, “looking at presidential politics as a 
contest of narratives has a tremendous explanatory power” (Cornog 
2004: 4). 
Presidential narratives may be lengthy and complex or quick and 
crude. They may originate from a presidential candidate or from a politi-
cal opponent. They may even emanate from a journalistic account like a 
newspaper article. Consequently, there  
are all kinds of presidential life stories, because there are all kinds 
of stories. The word “story” can refer to the course of a person’s 
entire life of a single moment in that life, to factual narratives and 
fictitious ones, and can even suggest a lie (or a “tall story”). (Cor-
nog 2004: 2)  
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Presidential narratives can be considered as a medium for institutional 
continuity and change through the mobilisation of ideas at a discursive 
level. In this light, narratives together with frames, myths, collective 
memories, stories, scripts, and more form the substantive dimension of 
ideas and discourse of “what is and what ought to be” at different levels 
of generality. From an interactive dimension, discursive processes are 
constructed in a ‘coordinative’ policy sphere and deliberated in a ‘com-
municative’ political sphere (Schmidt 2008, 2010). This discursive ap-
proach to the study of political institution by emphasising the explanato-
ry power of ideas in political analysis is known as “discursive institution-
alism” (DI). 
DI refers to  
an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political sci-
ence that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the 
interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged 
through discourse. (Schmidt 2010: 3) 
Dubbed as the “fourth intuitionalism” in political science after rational 
institutionalism (RI), historical institutionalism (HI), and sociological 
institutionalism (SI),3 DI emphasises the explanatory role of ideas and 
discourse in understanding institutional continuity and change. Discourse 
here is taken to encompass not only the substantive content of ideas but 
also the interactive processes in which these ideas are communicated. 
Discourse in DI is not just about the “text” or ideas (what is said) but 
also its context (where, when, how, and why it was said). Corollary, insti-
tutionalism in DI implies that this approach is not only about the com-
munication of “text” or ideas but the institutional context in which and 
through which ideas are communicated by discourse. Moreover, DI 
focuses not only on structure (what is said, or where and how) but also 
on agency (who said what to whom). Both are  
simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of 
meaning, which are internal to ‘sentient’ (thinking and speaking) 
agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ explain how they 
create and maintain institutions at the same time that their ‘fore-
                                                 
3  The emergence of “new institutionalism” in political science eschewed the 
formal-legal and a theoretical approach of the “old institutionalism” and shifted 
its focus on a more expansive definition of institutions to include informal 
conventions as formal rules that operated in more explicit and diverse theoreti-
cal frameworks. The first three distinct analytical approaches include the focus 
on historical context, rational calculations, and sociological culture and norms. 
See Lowndes and Robert 2013. 
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ground discursive abilities’ enable them to communicate critically 
about those institutions, to change (or maintain) them. (Schmidt 
2010: 4) 
While rules are conveyed through documents and legislation, and prac-
tices are modelled by actors, narratives are transmitted via the spoken 
word, literally by telling stories or relayed in symbolic form or scripts. 
From an institutional perspective, narratives can shape behaviour, con-
straining some actors and empowering others. Ultimately, “the most 
effective political institutions are characterised by resonant stories” 
(Lowndes and Robert 2013: 63). The following section will blend Vivien 
A. Schmidt’s discursive institutional analytical framework (2008, 2010) 
with Stephen Skowronek’s concept of presidential leadership in political 
time (1997, 2011). I will also analyse how crafted narratives are trans-
formed into governance scripts that bind together a coalition of interests 
within a particular institutional setting. 
Cycle of Presidential Narratives 
The history of the Philippine presidency has been marked by a cycle of 
regime narratives. Given the underdeveloped ideological articulation in 
Philippine politics, presidential regimes consist of quasi-programmatic, 
emotive narratives in election campaigns and/or a governance script that 
binds together a coalition of interests within a particular institutional 
context. Hence, presidential regime narratives can be  
biographical or those ‘told’ by a group; openly expressed or ‘hid-
den’; personal or overtly political; contemporary or ‘historicised’; 
with the ‘story telling’ involved analysed from a psychological, pol-
icy, ideological, or subaltern perspective, among others. The major 
claim is that politicians offer competing ‘nationalist’ or ‘anti-
American,’ ‘populist’ or ‘rich-versus-poor,’ and ‘reformist’ or ‘anti-
corruption’ narratives in the struggle for voter support. (Thomp-
son 2010a: 5) 
The Philippine presidency, acting both as an agent and as a structure of 
governance, has shaped and been shaped by the cycles of political devel-
opment and decay through political time. This cycle has been expressed 
through “regime narratives” or the governing “script” that binds togeth-
er a coalition of interests within a particular institutional context (Tee-
hankee 2016b; Thompson 2014). The ability to constantly form coali-
tions in a system where stable coalitions are elusive is the primary gov-
ernance requisite of an incumbent president. Thus,  
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the dynamic interplay between regimes and presidents […] re-
quires presidents to attend regularly to the problems of building 
and maintaining coalitions across parties and even across the re-
gime-opposition boundary. (Lieberman 2000: 277) 
To accomplish this, most presidents embrace established story lines or 
narratives that provide the “governing scripts” for their administration. 
There are four dominant regime narratives in the history of the 
Philippine presidency: the narrative of the “unfinished revolution” (na-
tionalist), the narrative of the “great nation” (developmentalist), the nar-
rative of “good governance” (reformist), and the narrative of the “masa” 
(populist). These narratives are attempts to address the four continuing 
challenges of the Filipino nation-state, namely identity, modernity, ac-
countability, and equity (see Table 2).4 The “unfinished revolution” and 
the “aborted nation” have become recurring narratives that have rever-
berated across succeeding regimes in the Philippines. As Abinales and 
Amoroso asserted,  
The birth of the Filipino nation was not only ‘aborted’ by U.S. co-
lonialism, as many Filipinos feel today, it was already riven with 
class conflict. Tension between elites and masses would become a 
defining feature of Philippine political development, lending an 
‘unfinished’ quality to the political discourse of the revolution to 
the present day. (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 129) 
The narrative of the “Great Nation” was a logical continuity to the nar-
rative of the “Unfinished Revolution.” Taken from a modernisation 
perspective, development and modernity ought to be the natural out-
come of nation-building.5 According to AR Magno, the so-called “na-
tional development” regimes that emerged in the 1970s to the 1980s 
simplified the issue of underdevelopment to mere problems of “efficien-
cy” and “manageability” that could be resolved by adequate “planning” 
and strong political will as evoked by Ferdinand Marcos (Magno 1990: 8).  
                                                 
4  There is a fourth narrative that cuts across the four other narratives: the narrative 
of the “demos” or the democratic narrative. Given the legitimising power of the 
democratic narrative, both democrats and autocrats have conveniently appro-
priated the democratic narrative at critical historical junctures. Marcos, for ex-
ample, justified his declaration of martial law by claiming to save the democrat-
ic system from the oligarchical Right and communist Left. 
5  On the other hand, post-colonial and postmodernist scholars find the perspec-
tive of modernisation theory, in general, and the very concept of modernity, in 
particular, very problematic and teleological. 
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Good governance and reforms became the counter-narrative to 
Marcos’ developmental authoritarianism. By battling the “evils” of cor-
ruption, political reformists often make claims of the “good” in their 
crusade for “good governance.” This story line is attractive to the mem-
bers of the middle class who often deplore government inefficiencies 
and as well as the material and financial resources lost to institutionalised 
corruption. By making personal sacrifices and enduring their lot at the 
hands of “corrupt” officials, reformists become worthy of the public’s 
trust. Hence, the reformist narrative flows from the political promise “I 
will help you […] because I am (morally) good” (Thompson 2010). 
“Honesty” and “sincerity” are often used as code words for the reform-
ist narrative. Lastly, populism (from the Latin word populis) refers to “a 
movement, a regime, a leader, or even a state which claims close affinity 
with the people” (De Castro 2007: 930). As an ideology, it is misused or 
abused, and sometimes reviled since “it gives expression to the crudest 
hopes and fears of the masses and by leaving no scope for deliberation 
and rational analysis” (Heywood 2000: 178). Populists usually make class 
appeals and claim to champion the poor. Latin American-style populism 
fully emerged in the Philippines on the heels of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and shortly after, with the election of Joseph Estrada as the coun-
try’s thirteenth president. The post-crisis regional environment saw the 
electoral victories of populist politicians not only in the Philippines but 
in Thailand as well. 
Table 2. Competing Narratives in Political Time 
 Unfinished 
Revolution 
Great 
Nation 
Good Gov-
ernance 
Masa 
Nationalist 
(identity) 
Aguinaldo 
Quezon 
Osmeña 
Laurel 
 
   
 
 
 
Duterte 
Developmentalist 
(modernity) 
Garcia 
Marcos 
 
Roxas 
Quirino 
Macapagal-
Arroyo 
Ramos Macapagal 
Reformist 
(accountability) 
  Aquino 
Aquino III 
Magsaysay 
Populist 
(equity) 
Estrada    
Note:  Italicised names are “mixed-narrative presidencies”. 
Source:  Culled by the author. 
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Presidential administrations can either be one of two distinct types: (1) 
“single-narrative presidency”, which adheres to one governing script or 
story line, or (2) “mixed-narrative presidency”, which follows two or 
more governing scripts or story lines. Single-narrative presidencies in-
clude those of Aguinaldo, Quezon, Osmeña and Laurel, all of whom 
extolled the virtues of nationalism, lamented the “unfinished revolution” 
of 1898 and built a coalition of anti-colonial interests. The mother-and-
son presidencies of Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Aquino III high-
lighted the reformist narrative of good governance and crusaded against 
endemic corruption. Roxas, Quirino, and Macapagal-Arroyo pursued the 
goal of economic reconstruction and development as a source of politi-
cal legitimacy. 
Others saw the potency of mixed-narratives. Magsaysay, for exam-
ple, coupled his reformist anti-corruption crusade with a populist “man-
of-the-masses” image. Macapagal, who anchored his developmental 
vision in his “poor man” background, emulated Magsaysay’s example. 
Estrada enhanced his populist “pro-masa” image with a nationalist narra-
tive that drew not from Emilio Aguinaldo but from Andres Bonifacio – 
the so-called “Great Plebeian” who launched the revolution against 
Spain in 1896. Garcia’s “Filipino First Policy” and Marcos’ “New Society” 
were attempts to mobilise nationalist sentiments with developmental 
ambitions. The following section will expound on the narrative of the 
unfinished revolution. 
The Unfinished Revolution 
Emilio Aguinaldo, the general who led the revolution against the Spanish 
colonisers, headed the first Philippine republic as its president. Unfortu-
nately, the nascent republic and Aguinaldo’s fledgling regime were prem-
aturely aborted as a result of cooptation and betrayal by the local elites in 
favour of the American colonisers.6 After the capture of Aguinaldo and 
the fall of the first Philippine republic in 1901, the Americans immediate-
                                                 
6  During a four-year period, Aguinaldo presided over four phases of the Philip-
pine revolution against Spain: (1) as president of the revolutionary government 
of Tejeros, 22 March to 1 November 1897; (2) as president of the Biyak-na-
Bato republic, 2 November 1897 to 15 December 1897; (3) as dictator of the 
revolutionary government, 24 May 1898 to 23 June 1898; and (4) as president 
of the First Philippine Republic of Malolos, 23 March 1901. See Ocampo 1999: 
27. 
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ly started a process of colonial state-building. 7  The members of the 
Nacionalista Party (Nationalist Party, NP), under the leadership of Que-
zon and Osmeña, established themselves as heirs of the 1896 nationalist 
revolution and the 1899 Malolos Republic, while publicly advocating 
eventual “independence under the protectorate of the United States of 
America” (Cullinane 2003). Nonetheless, Quezon’s brand of nationalism 
was conservative compared to that of the lower-class peasants, workers 
and veterans of the revolution, who advocated a more radical, if not a 
millenarian, vision of nationalism that hewed more closely to the spirit of 
the Philippine revolution (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Ironically, the 
outbreak of the Second World War and the Japanese invasion created a 
political opportunity for the resurgence of this brand of nationalism. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Japan used propaganda 
to legitimise its invasion of the Philippines and other Asian countries, 
particularly the “Asia for the Asians” slogan directed against Western 
colonialism. As part of its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” 
project, Japan established puppet governments in its occupied countries, 
including the Philippines. Thus, the Second Republic was formed in 
1943 with Jose P. Laurel selected as president by the National Assembly. 
To eliminate American influence in the Philippines, the Japanese colonial 
regime invoked the “unfinished revolution” and encouraged the emer-
gence of suppressed Filipino nationalist sentiments (Abinales and Amo-
roso 2005). 
In other parts of Southeast Asia, the Japanese invasion signalled the 
twilight of Western colonialism and the strengthening of anti-colonial 
nationalist movements. In the Philippines, however, most of the Filipino 
elites who collaborated with the Japanese did so for pragmatic considera-
tions or in deference to Quezon’s directive to cooperate in order to en-
sure continuity of a civilian government through the newly installed 
Japanese regime. There was a segment of the elite, led by Laurel, who 
saw the opportunity to implement alternative nationalist programmes, 
such as teaching and writing in Filipino languages, restoring accounts of 
                                                 
7  This institutional project was implemented from the bottom up according to 
the following process: first, local autonomy preceded the development of cen-
tral authority; second, party formation preceded national elections; and third, 
elections preceded bureaucratic institutionalisation. The American colonial ad-
ministration relied heavily on local clans or principalia to consolidate power 
throughout the archipelago. Building on their base of local notables, caciques, 
and political clans, the Americans gradually introduced elections at the munici-
pal (1901) and provincial (1902) levels, then for the national legislature (1907). 
This exercise of suffrage culminated in the presidential elections under the Phil-
ippine Commonwealth (1935). See Paredes 1989: 70–160. 
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the Philippine Revolution in local history books and situating the Philip-
pines as part of Asia.8 Outside the members of the elite who served in 
both the Commonwealth and the Second Republic, there were others 
who were ultra-nationalist, anti-American, and pro-Japanese. They in-
cluded former revolutionaries like Emilio Aguinaldo and Artemio Ricarte, 
as well as mass leader and Quezon oppositionist Benigno Ramos.9 After 
the war, those who served in the Japanese-sponsored republic (led by 
Laurel and other prominent members of the elite like Claro M. Recto) 
were prosecuted and later amnestied by the post-war administration. 
Both Laurel and Recto continued to be the articulators of the “unfin-
ished revolution” brand of nationalism way into the post-war, neo-
colonial Third Philippine Republic (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). 
For historian Reynaldo Ileto, the “unfinished revolution” has been 
an important political discourse deployed in post-war politics and nation-
building. He wrote:  
[…] at the outset that Filipino politicians of all colors have always 
felt a need to speak in the idiom of radical nationalism, which 
originates from the experience and memories of the revolution 
against Spain in 1896–98 and the Philippine-American war of 
1899–1902. These events were inspired by both folk Christian tra-
ditions and the Enlightenment ideals of the French revolution. 
The discourse of “Unfinished Revolution” has proven to be ex-
tremely effective in mobilizing people and votes in modern Phil-
ippine politics. Any candidate or party hoping to succeed in elec-
toral politics has had to ride on this sentiment since the first elec-
tions in 1906. (Ileto 2004: 2) 
Consequently, the narrative of the “unfinished revolution” has been 
appropriated by the conservative and radical political forces in the Phil-
ippines, albeit with differing starting points. Radical nationalist historians 
and activists such as Teodoro Agoncillo, Jose Maria Sison, and Renato 
Constantino have pointed to the “revolution from below” of Andres 
Bonifacio. On the other hand, conservative nationalist politicians traced 
                                                 
8  Laurel’s father served in the revolutionary army of Aguinaldo and was a signa-
tory to the 1898 Malolos Constitution. He hailed from the province of Batan-
gas, where some of the bloodiest skirmishes between American troops and Fil-
ipino revolutionaries had occurred, followed by a harsh pacification campaign. 
Although he joined the Nacionalista Party and agreed to play the colonial polit-
ical game, he was quite critical of American colonialism in the Philippines. See 
Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 160. 
9  For a detailed account of the issue of Filipino elite collaboration with the Japa-
nese invaders, see de Viana 2003: 35–110. 
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the “unfinished revolution” to Aguinaldo’s First Republic. Marcos, for 
example, connected his so-called “democratic revolution” (the imposi-
tion of authoritarian rule) to Aguinaldo’s short-lived republic (Ileto 1993). 
Duterte’s Nationalist Revival 
National politics in the post-Marcos Philippines have largely been a bat-
tle between two enduring narratives – reformism vs. populism. The post-
Marcos Philippine “reformist” regime is based on a discourse of democ-
racy and “good governance” characteristic of Cory Aquino’s presidency 
and most of her successors. If a dominant regime “script” is seen to be 
challenged or, worse, abandoned by a president, the result is can be a 
severe legitimacy crisis. The “apostasy” of the Arroyo presidency can be 
understood in terms of such illegitimacy. Arroyo (who ascended the 
presidency trough the ouster of a “populist” incumbent) abandoned the 
reformist “narrative” (which had catapulted her to power) in her fight 
for political survival against another “populist” challenge (in which she 
manipulated the results of the 2004 election). Consequently, she suffered 
from a legitimacy crisis that nearly led to her being overthrown extra-
constitutionally through civil protests and/or coup attempts. According 
to Mark Thompson (2010b: 163),  
The post-Marcos rise of the populist and reformist campaign nar-
ratives means that voters can no longer be simply divided into in-
cumbent “ins” and opposition “outs.” Instead, they must also be 
seen as tending to fall into either a camp that stresses paternalistic 
promises to end corruption or one that favors (elite resistance 
notwithstanding) policies meant to help the poor.10 
The rise of Duterte repudiates the reformist-versus-populist dichotomy 
that characterised post-Marcos politics by reviving the nationalist narra-
tive prominent during the post-war Third Philippine Republic. This 
narrative has been popularised in the writings of prominent intellectuals, 
mostly members of the Filipino elite, such as senators Claro M. Recto, 
Lorenzo Tañada, and Jose Diokno, industrialist Salvador Araneta, Har-
vard-trained lawyer-economist Alejandro Lichauco, economist Dr Em-
manuel Yap and historians Teodoro Agoncillo and Renato Constantino. 
Nationalist fervour percolated during the 1950s as anti-establishment 
intellectuals began to question the colonial interpretation of Filipino 
                                                 
10  Thompson adds that the reformist-versus-populist split in the Philippines can 
be compared to the yellowshirt-versus-redshirt cleavage that divides Thailand. 
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history with the dissemination of alternative histories and biographies. 
With the defeat of the Huk rebellion and the outlawing of the old Par-
tido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP, Communist Party of the Philippines), 
a number of former PKP members or Huk sympathisers emerged who 
continued their nationalist struggle in the classrooms as teachers (espe-
cially at the University of the Philippines and the Lyceum of Manila) or 
in the pages of newspapers and magazines (such as the Manila Times and 
Philippines Free Press) as journalists. Politicians and civil libertarians also 
questioned the continued American military and economic presence in 
the country. Carlos Garcia, Claro M. Recto, and Jose P. Laurel of the NP 
launched their “Filipino First” campaign. Later, even the NP’s arch rival 
– the Liberal Party (LP) – would expropriate the narrative of the “unfin-
ished revolution” under President Diosdado Macapagal (Ileto 1993).  
However, the benign and almost conservative brand of the PKP 
and NP gave way to a more radical version fuelled by the new Left led by 
Jose Maria Sison. Writing as Amado Guerrero, the founding chairman of 
the re-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Sison’s 
reclamation of the “unfinished revolution” served as one of the symbolic 
foundations of the Maoist student radicals who fashioned themselves as 
heirs to the revolutionaries of 1896. He described the Philippines as a 
semi-colony of the US. Despite having granted formal independence to 
the Philippines, he claimed, the US continues to violate the national 
sovereignty of the Filipino people (Claudio 2013). 
For Amando Doronila,  
the postwar explosion of nationalism was a continuation of the 
Filipinos historical struggle for independence – a continuity reso-
nant in the emotive rhetoric of post-independence Filipino leaders, 
such as the call for completing the “unfinished revolution.” (Do-
ronila 1986: 39) 
Essentially, the nationalist revival was a reaction to the humiliating pres-
ence of two large US military bases and the unequal economic treatises 
imposed on the Philippines after regaining its independence in 1946. 
Unfortunately, Filipino nationalism was isolated from the more radical 
Pan-Asian nationalism and was treated as a pariah due to its dominating 
neocolonial relationship with the US.  
It was against this backdrop that the young Rodrigo Duterte be-
came embroiled with the nationalist rhetoric of the Left. Duterte was 
taking his undergraduate degree in political science at the Lyceum in the 
late 1960s when he became a student of the young professorial lecturer 
Jose Maria Sison. Sison said: 
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I am proud to say that President Duterte was my student in politi-
cal science at the Lyceum of the Philippines when I was still a 
young professorial lecturer. He became a member of the Kabataang 
Makabayan [Nationalist Youth] of which I was the national chair-
man. (Macas 2016)  
Sison added, “[we] are both inspired by the principles and objectives of 
Kabataang Makabayan and driven by the patriotic desire to continue the 
unfinished revolution of Andres Bonifacio” (Sabillo 2016). Based on 
these personal and ideological relations, the CPP had a long history of 
cooperation with the Davao mayor. This personal bond and the presi-
dent’s rising anti-American rhetoric has made it easier for the Philippine 
government to restart the peace process with the Communists (Chanco 
2016).  
Janus-faced Nationalism 
Filipino nationalism is “constructed upon a history of opposition to a 
colonial and alien ‘other’” (Ileto 1993: 78). By reviving the anti-US na-
tionalism of his youth, Duterte is repudiating the liberal reformist, albeit 
elitist, narrative of the Aquino-to-Aquino regime. As the first president 
to be elected from Mindanao, he is not only channelling resentment 
against “imperial Manila” but also reckoning the historical blowback of 
“US imperialism”, which has been most felt in in recent years due to the 
“War on Terror.” While nationalism may be fuelling Duterte’s foreign 
policy stance vis-à-vis the United States, his economic position remains 
within the neoliberal orthodoxy and is unlikely to impose economic 
protectionism (unlike in the US under a potential Donald Trump presi-
dency).11 
A “new” nationalism can be observed in the Asian region. Strong 
leaders have emerged, cloaking their regime with nationalist discourse. In 
Japan, Shinzo Abe was returned as prime minister by the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party with the promise of reforming the economy but ended up 
transforming the Japanese peaceful security policy and norm, amidst the 
rise of China. In China, Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party prince-
ling offered his slogan of “realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.” Other Asian leaders, such as Recep Tayyip Erdoan of Turkey 
and Narendra Modi of India, have made similar nationalist posturing. 
                                                 
11  Duterte is most likely to pursue a developmental state/state capitalist approach 
with emphasis on agrarian reform and nationalist industrialisation. 
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Rodrigo Duterte joins this growing list of nationalist strongmen in the 
region. 
In the end, nationalism can be Janus-faced, it can unite internally 
and divide externally (Nairn 1997). The resurgence of nationalism, not 
only in Asia, but even in Europe, is an indication of the adverse reaction 
to globalisation, as the losers in the borderless world attempt to win back 
control of their respective national borders. For the Philippines, as histo-
rian Vicente Rafael explains,  
Nationalism is inherently conflictual, caught between dynas-
tic/colonial modes of apprehension on the one hand and the pos-
sibilities of an egalitarian, postcolonial existence on the other; but 
that the means for imagining nationhood may at times be at odds 
with the very nature of the images that are reproduced. (Rafael 
1990: 593) 
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